What Would a Ground Invasion Mean for Lebanon and Israel?
Israel has learned from its mistakes in the 2006 invasion, but Hezbollah has too. So, what's the strategy now?
Israeli main battle tanks were deployed in the Upper Galilee region of northern Israel on September 28, 2024 [Jalaa MAREY/AFP].30 Sep 2024
### The Buffer Zone Dilemma
On paper, establishing a buffer zone along the border may seem like a viable solution for Israel, but in reality, it would likely lead to significant challenges. To maintain such a zone, Israel would need ground forces to hold the terrain, which is mountainous and rocky, restricting movement and forcing tanks and vehicles onto narrow roads—ideal for Hezbollah ambushes.
In 2006, Hezbollah effectively ambushed Israeli armored columns and targeted patrols, catching Israel off guard. At least 20 tanks were destroyed or rendered inoperable due to tactical missteps by inexperienced commanders. However, this time, Israel's military is more seasoned after a year of urban warfare against Hamas and is known for quickly correcting operational mistakes.
Yet, Hezbollah has also evolved. Its forces have grown from around 5,000 fighters in 2006 to an estimated 20,000–30,000 today, with 3,000 elite Radwan Force soldiers trained specifically for the southern region. Hezbollah's arsenal of advanced anti-tank weapons, such as the Kornet missile, poses a significant threat to Israel’s Merkava tanks. Both sides also heavily rely on drone surveillance to track each other’s movements.
For Israel, maintaining a buffer zone would require constant ground presence, surveillance, and air power. Troops would face constant threats from ambushes, sniper fire, roadside bombs, and rockets, leading to potential casualties and body bags returning home.
Even if a buffer zone were established, it would not stop Hezbollah from launching missiles, rockets, and drones into Israel. Hezbollah’s long-range capabilities mean that rockets could still strike deep inside Israel from anywhere in Lebanon. Expanding the buffer zone could bring more Lebanese civilians under Israeli occupation, escalating the conflict. If Hezbollah’s rocket attacks persisted, Israel might either face the untenable option of taking over the entire country or withdrawing altogether.
This scenario risks "mission creep," where a seemingly straightforward objective—establishing a buffer zone—turns into an unachievable goal, dragging Israel into a prolonged conflict that its military and economy can hardly sustain.
At what point will Israel realize that military force may not provide a long-term solution, and that negotiations, particularly concerning Gaza, might be the only path forward?
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